The relationship between the laws set by the European Union and national legislation within member states is one which has sparked much contention, especially in Poland. As the legal framework of the EU becomes greater, member states see their national authority undermined by EU law superceding national law. This hierarchical matter has led to much dissatisfaction following concerns for national sovereignty and self-governance. It has been noted that, “the consensual and gradual logic of EU integration has also led to institutional asymmetries and gaps within individual integration blocks”, underscoring the complexity and unbalanced nature of EU integration within member states. Finding a balance between EU authority and national law is becoming ever more critical.
In recent years, Poland has posed much challenge to what its government considers to be the EU’s ‘unfair’ fiscal sanctions in retaliation to its striking increase in defence expenditure, with Poland’s defence budget set to reach a staggering 4.7% per GDP by 2025. This figure is more than double of the EU average defence expenditure of 1.3% per GDP in 2022. Consequently, Poland has become subject to the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), a mechanism constructed to ensure that member states maintain a sensical budgetary structure. Principally, under the EDP, the state under constraint has no ability to vote regarding decisions related to its budget contraventions, increasing the tensions surrounding the process.
Poland’s finance minister, Andrzej Domanski has appealed for “special treatment” as he argued that a sizable amount of the state’s defence budget would be of indirect benefit to other EU member states due to fostering regional security in the presence of threats posed by the Russo-Ukrainian war. As a result, Domanski has asserted that he feels optimistic that the EU will approve Poland’s plan of deficit-reduction, which presents the notion that Poland will reduce its defence budget to 2.9% of the GDP by 2028, so long as the country sustains its current economic trajectory. Despite these assertions, this matter highlights the tensions between the EU regulations and laws and national autonomy, particularly in reference to defence considerations, becoming an increasingly paramount concern in the region.
More recently, the relationship between the EU and Poland came under further pressure. On October 12th 2024, the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that he planned to temporarily suspend the right to asylum in Poland as part of a speech regarding the broader effort to toughen national migration policies. This action led to the EU Commission reminding Poland of its obligations under both EU and international law. This notion dates back to the Refugee Convention of 1951, which was incorporated into Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and which holds the same legal weight as EU treaties.
Poland’s move has reinvigorated discussions regarding the need for balance between EU and national sovereignty. In response to such discussions, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has adopted a legal analysis formula which ensures that “any assessment of national practice conducted in the name of effectiveness shall include assessment of the place of the relevant rule”. This allows for accounts of more nuanced legal analysis of individual states. An approach such as this offers more flexibility and specification of EU law which fosters a more balanced and mutually-beneficial relationship between the EU’s legal framework and national sovereignty.
In addition, Article 2 of the Charter for Fundamental Human Rights outlines that there is specific protocol for Poland, stipulating that applications of EU law will only be made if they abide by the rights or principles of the nation’s legislative bodies. This provision permits Poland a degree of autonomy within EU law, allowing them to apply relevant EU legal standards in accordance with their nation’s legal traditions, within reason.
Marek Dabrowski highlights that EU membership is voluntary, and member states have the ability to withdraw their commitment if they so wish. However, the voluntary nature of the EU has created some dysfunctions within its structure, particularly when nations disregard its principles. Dabrowski argues that voluntarily-agreed rules supported by a strong supranational enforcement framework would mitigate such issues. While the European Commission holds certain devices such as sanctions, these tools take time to implement and can be largely inefficient in the insurance of fiscal discipline regarding fundamental EU values. Hence, the EU struggles to arrest member states from going against the institution’s core principles, including the rule of law. Dabrowski recommends that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) be granted more authority in reviewing and ratifying national legislation which conflicts with that of the EU, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Proposing this would address the challenges faced by the Union.
The ongoing tensions between Poland’s national sovereignty and the European Union underscore the complexities of trying to balance the overarching legal stature of the EU and national autonomy. A more robust and clearly defined legal framework would aid in addressing the interests of both the EU and member states. As a result, this would lead to the unity of the EU and the protection of its member’s national identities and legal traditions, promoting mutually-beneficial collaboration and long-term stability across the region.
Image by Dave Kellem via Wikimedia Commons